Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
To gain the access rights on an authentication server (AS) a password based remote user authentication schemes is used. The remote user makes a login request with the help of some secret information which are provided by the AS. On the other side the AS checks the validity of a login request made by a remote user U.
In these schemes, the AS and the remote user U share a secret, which is often called as password. With the knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses MANOJ KUMAR: THE MODIFIED SCHEME IS STILL VULNERABLE TO PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK 2 it to create a valid login request to the AS. AS checks the validity of the login request to provide the access rights to the user U. Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts cards [3] - [4] - [5] - [6] - [12] - [13] - [14] - [18] - [20] - [21] - [24] - [29] have been proposed.
Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication scheme using smart cards. In Lamport's scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and practical ability of Lamport's scheme. In addition, the Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack [7] . Since then, many similar schemes [23] - [26] have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification password table should be securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a disadvantage for the security point of view. If the password table is stolen /removed /modified by the adversary, the AS will be partially or totally braked/affected.
In 2002, Chien-Jan-Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [31] pointed out some attacks [7] - [28] - [30] on Chien -Jan and Tseng's scheme. According to Ku and Chen, Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection attack [7] and an insider attack [30] . Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.'s scheme is also not reparable [30] . In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to prevent the attacks: reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme. In the same year, Hsu [10] pointed out that the Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme is still vulnerable to a parallel session attack and Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the password change phase of improved scheme of Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme is still MANOJ KUMAR: THE MODIFIED SCHEME IS STILL VULNERABLE TO PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK 3 insecure.
A. Contributions
This paper analyzes that the modified scheme of Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to parallel session attack.
B. Organization
Section II reviews the Ku and Chen's scheme [31] . Section III reviews Hsu [10] and Yoon et al.'s comments on Ku and Chen's scheme .Section IV reviews Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . Section V is about our observations on the security pitfall of Yoon et al.'s scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section VI.
II. REVIEW OF KU AND CHEN'S SCHEME
This section briefly describes Ku and Chen's scheme [31] . This scheme has four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four phases are described below.
A. Registration Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase.
Step.R1: User U selects a random number b and computes PW S = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PW S to the AS through a secure channel.
Step.R2: AS computes a secret number R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PW S , where EID = (ID n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration.
Step.R3: AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains the secret number R and a one-way function f.
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Step.R4: User U enters his random number b into his smart card.
B. Login Phase
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to gain the access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Step.L1:
Here T U denotes the current date and time of the smart card reader.
Step.L2: Sends a login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) to the AS.
C. Verification Phase
Assume AS receives the message C at time T S, where T S is the current date and time at AS. Then the AS takes the following actions:
Step.V1: If the identity ID and the time T U are not valid, then AS will rejects this login request.
Step.V2: Checks, if
, then the AS accepts the login request and computes
Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected.
Step.V3: AS sends the pair (C 3 , T S ) to the user U for mutual authentication.
Step.V4: If the time T S is invalid i.e. T U = T S , then U terminates the session.
Otherwise, the user U verifies the equation
D. Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new password, say PW new . This phase has the following steps.
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Step.P1: U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader keys the identity and the password and then requests to change the password. Next, U enters a new password PW new .
Step.P2: U's smart cards computes a new secret number
and then replaces R with R new .
III. REVIEW OF HSU AND YOON ET AL.'S COMMENT ON THE KU AND CHEN'S SCHEME

A. Hsu's Comment
According to Hsu, Ku and Chen's scheme is vulnerable to a parallel session attack [10] . The intruder Bob intercepts the communication between the AS and user U and then from this intercepted information, he makes a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user. The intruder Bob applies the following steps for a successful parallel session attack.
Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) which is sent by a valid user U to AS.
Intercepts the response message (C 3 , T S ), which is sent by AS to the user U.
Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request C f = (ID, C 3 , T S ).
The fabricated login request passes all the requirements for a successful authentication of the intruder Bob by the AS, due to the fact that the second part , C 3 , of the login request also satisfies the verification equation the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login request. The AS will not authenticate a registered user U, because
the verification phase.
IV. YOON ET AL.'S SCHEME
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . This scheme also has four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four phases are described below.
A. Registration Phase
User U selects a random number b and computes PW S = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PW S to the AS through a secure channel.
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AS computes two secret numbers V = f (EID ⊕ x) and R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PW S , where EID = (ID n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration.
AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f.
User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card.
B. Login Phase
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to gain access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Sends a login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) to the AS.
C. Verification Phase
If the identity ID and the time T U is invalid i.e. T U =T S , then AS will rejects this login request.
AS sends the pair (C 3 , T S ) to the user U for mutual authentication.
If the time T S is invalid i.e. T U =T S , then U terminates the session. Otherwise,
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D. Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one, say PW new . This phase has the following steps.
U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his identity and the old password PW and then requests to change the password.
U's smart cards computes
Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in the smart card of the user U. If they are equal, then U can select a new password PW new , otherwise the smart card rejects the password change request.
U's smart cards computes a new secret number
and then replaces R with R new . Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) which is sent by a valid user U to AS. In this login request C, the time T U is the current time of the smart card reader, whenever the user U makes the login request.
V. OUR OBSERVATION: PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK
Intercepts the response message (C 3 , T S ), which is sent by AS to he user U. In this response message, the time T S in the current time at the AS, when AS receives the login request C.
Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request AS sends the pair T S and C 3 to the user U for mutual authentication. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the modified scheme of Yoon et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to the parallel session attack. As, we have observed that Yoon et al.
just consider the security problems in the password change phase of Ku and Chen's scheme and repaired that phase only. They again presented a modified scheme with same security parameters as it was with previous security parameters.
Thus, the security pitfalls are still exists in Yoon et al.'s scheme.
